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Abstract

Measuring the extent to which assortative matching differs between two economies
is challenging when the marginal distributions of the characteristic along which sorting
takes place (e.g. education) also changes for either or both sexes. Drawing from the
statistics literature we define simple conditions that any index has to satisfy to provide
a measure of change in sorting that is not distorted by changes in the marginal distributions of the characteristic. While our characterisation of indices of assortativeness
is not complete, and hence cannot exclude the possibility of multiple indices providing
contradictory results, in an empirical application to US data we find that all indices
satisfying our conditions indicate that homogamy by education has increased over time.

1

Introduction

The study of sorting in the marriage market has recently attracted renewed attention. The
degree of homogamy in marriage - defined as people’s tendency to ‘marry their own’ - has
important consequences for family inequalities and intergenerational transmission of human
capital. It is therefore surprising that the various studies on this topic have not reached a
consensus on the evolution of homogamy over the recent years, and even on how to best
measure homogamy (e.g. Chiappori et al., 2017; Ciscato and Weber, 2020; Eika et al., 2019;
∗
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Fernández and Rogerson, 2001; Greenwood et al., 2014; Mare and Schwartz, 2005; Siow,
2015, to mention but a few).
The goal of this paper is to understand why different approaches to the same problem, using similar data, can reach opposite conclusions and, more generally, to clarify the theoretical
issues underlying the choice of a particular measure of assortativeness.
Our analysis considers two populations, say women and men, sorting in marriage according to a one-dimensional characteristic, say education. Whenever the marginal distributions
change – e.g., women’s average education increases – matching patterns will change. The
main problem faced by any measure of assortativeness is to disentangle the mechanical effects of such variations in the marginal distributions from deeper changes in the matching
structure itself, for instance originating from changes in the gain generated by assortativeness
along that characteristic. The latter represents what one would call ’changes in homogamy’.
Existing studies proposed various indices to measure assortativeness and changes therein.
These indices achieve this goal in different ways, and may therefore generate diverging conclusions. Here we argue that (i ) all acceptable indices should satisfy some basic requirements
that we describe below; (ii ) that whether an index satisfies these conditions or not can have
implications for whether educational homogamy has increased or not; and (iii ) in general,
it is useful that the index be based on a well specified structural model, so that the way it
operates can be clearly understood.

2

Measuring assortative matching and changes in assortativeness

We first define assortativeness and changes therein in a 2 × 2 matching market, where each
participant on either side of the market is in one of two groups defined by some characteristic
such as education. Later in this Section we will argue that assortativeness is fundamentally a
local concept and, hence, global measures aiming to summarise it over a wider range of values
2

for the characteristic of interest fail to detect variation in different margins and are difficult
to interpret. For simplicity, we will discuss positive assortativeness and increases in positive
assortativeness, but a symmetric discussion could be held for negative assortativeness.

2.1

Defining Assortative Matching

We start with a simple example. Consider an economy where an equal mass of men and
women match by their level of education, which can only take two values - say, High School
versus College. We will abstract from singles - everybody gets matched. The matching
patterns in this population are summarized by the 2 × 2 matching Table (a, b, c, d) shown
below. In the Table, a + b and a + c are the number of female and male college graduates
respectively, while a is the number of couples where both spouses are college graduates. In
what follows, we assume that b ≥ c, i.e. that women are more educated than men; the
alternative case obtains by switching b and c.
Table (a, b, c, d)
w\

h

C

HS

C

a

b

HS

c

d

We say that Table (a, b, c, d) exhibits Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) if the number of couples with equal education (the ‘diagonal’ of the Table) is larger than what would
obtain under random matching. Under random matching the number of couples where
both spouses are college graduates will simply be

(a+b)(a+c)
.
a+b+c+d

Then we have PAM if and

only if a (a + b + c + d) ≥ (a + b) (a + c) or equivalently if ad ≥ bc; this also implies that
more High School graduates marry each other than would be implied by random matching:
d (a + b + c + d) ≥ (b + d) (c + d).
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2.2

Defining ‘increases in Assortative Matching’: required properties

We now consider two Tables, T = (a, b, c, d) and T ′ = (a′ , b′ , c′ , d′ ), and ask under what
conditions can it be concluded that T is more assortative than T ′ . In other words, how can
we define an Assortativeness Index I (a, b, c, d) that quantifies the ‘degree of assortativeness’
of a Table? We define four basic properties that all indices of assortativeness should satisfy.
Scale Invariance Any index I should not depend on the total size of the population, i.e.:

I (λa, λb, λc, λd) = I (a, b, c, d) for all λ > 0.

Symmetry Any index I should treat the two categories (here, C and HS) identically;
in other words, the index characterizes the level of assortativeness of the whole table. In
practice, thus: I (a, b, c, d) = I (d, c, b, a).
Monotonicity Consider the case where the two tables T and T ′ represent the same total
population (a + b + c + d = a′ + b′ + c′ + d′ ) with identical marginal distributions - i.e., the
same proportion of educated men and women so that a + b = a′ + b′ and a + c = a′ + c′ . In
this case, Monotonicity requires that more assortativeness is equivalent to more people in
each diagonal cell. So T is more assortative than T ′ if a larger fraction of individuals marry
their own type in Table T than in Table T ′ . Formally:

a ≥ a′ or equivalently d ≥ d′ .

Perfect PAM We introduce two forms of this condition, weak and strong. The strong form
relates to the polar case that obtains when all educated men marry educated women. This
implies c = 0 and the sorting Table is T = (a, b, 0, d). T is perfectly (positive) assortative in
the sense that all educated individuals in the less educated population (men in our example)
4

marry a spouse in the same education group as themselves; the only ‘cross-marriages’ result
from the fact that educated women are more numerous than educated men.
The strong version of Perfect PAM states that T displays maximum degree of assortativeness, so no other Table can display strictly more assortativeness than T . So if a ranking
of Tables by assortativeness is defined by an index, this index should reach its maximum
value for T .
A weaker version of the condition applies to populations with an equal proportion of
educated men and women. In that case, Perfect PAM obtains when c = 0 and b = 0, so all
educated individuals marry their own. In statistical terms, the association between spouses’
educations is then absolute in the sense of Kendall and Stuart (1961). Weak Perfect PAM
therefore states that no Table can display strictly more assortativeness than Table (a, 0, 0, d).
Clearly, Perfect PAM implies the Weak version, while the converse is not true.
Our main claim is that any acceptable measure of assortativeness must satisfy (at least)
Scale Invariance, Symmetry, Monotonicity and Weak Perfect PAM. In particular, it cannot
be the case that a Table in which all individuals marry their own is found to be strictly
less assortative than a Table that includes cross-marriages. As we shall see, imposing these
conditions has bite, since some existing indices violate some of them.

2.3

Existing indices

We now briefly review some of the most commonly used indices in the literature.
Odds Ratio This is probably the most widely used index:

IO (a, b, c, d) = ln

ad
bc



The odds ratio is popular in the demographic literature, as it can be directly derived from
the log-linear approach (see for instance Mare (2001), Mare and Schwartz (2005), BouchetValat (2014)); in economics, it was used by Siow (2015) (‘local odds ratio’) Chiappori et al.
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(2017), Ciscato and Weber (2020), Chiappori, Costa-Dias, Crossman and Meghir (2020)
among many others.

Correlation A natural index is the correlation between wife’s and husband’s educations,
each considered as a Bernoulli random variable taking the value C with probability
(resp.

a+c
)
a+b+c+d

and HS with probability

c+d
a+b+c+d

(resp.

b+d
).
a+b+c+d

a+b
a+b+c+d

This has been used in

various contributions (for instance Greenwood et al., 2003, 2014), either explicitly or through
a linear regression framework. Here:
ad − bc
ICorr (a, b, c, d) = p
(a + b) (c + d) (a + c) (b + d)
One can readily check that, in our case, the correlation index also coincides with Spearman’s rank correlation, which exploits the natural ranking of education levels (C > HS).
Equivalently, one can consider the χ2 index, which is χ2 (a, b, c, d) = [ICorr (a, b, c, d)]2
Minimum Distance In the minimum distance approach of Fernández and Rogerson
(2001) and Abbott et al. (2019), one constructs the convex combination of two extreme
cases (random and perfectly assortative) that minimizes the distance with the Table under
consideration, and defines the weight of the perfectly assortative component as the index.
Here, it is equal to:
IM D (a, b, c, d) =

ad − bc
A

where A = (c + d) (a + c) if b ≥ c and A = (b + d) (a + b) if c ≥ b. This coincides in our
context, with the ‘perfect-random normalization’ of Liu and Lu (2006) and Shen (2019).

Likelihood Ratio This index, introduced by Eika et al. (2019) measures marital sorting
between men of education level I and women of education level J by the ratio of the actual

6

probability of matching relative to what would occur at random:

IL (a, b, c, d) =

2.4
2.4.1

a (a + b + c + d)
(a + b) (a + c)

Properties of the indices of assortativeness
The main result

The following summarises the properties of the indices of assortativeness defined above:
Result Among indices just described:
• The odds ratio and the minimum distance index both satisfy Scale Invariance, Symmetry, Monotonicity and Perfect PAM (therefore Weak Perfect PAM).
• Correlation and Spearman rank correlation both satisfy Scale Invariance, Symmetry,
Monotonicity and Weak Perfect PAM but not Perfect PAM.
• The Likelihood ratio satisfies Scale Invariance and Monotonicity; it does not satisfy
Symmetry nor Weak Perfect PAM.
To illustrate the issue that can arise with a simple example, compare Tables A and B
corresponding, for instance, to two different cohorts in the same economy (population sizes
normalized to 1):
Table A = (.03, .07, .07, .83)

Table B = (.5, 0, 0, .5)

h
w\

C

HS

w\

C

.03

.07

HS

.07

.83

h

C

HS

C

.5

0

HS

0

.5

The distribution of education is independent of gender in both A and B, but the number
of educated people has increased from 10% to 50% between A an B. Cohort A exhibits PAM
in the usual sense (more people on the diagonal than would obtain under random matching);
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yet, 70% of educated people marry an uneducated spouse. Cohort B displays perfect PAM,
with all college educated individuals marrying together. The indices discussed above that
satisfy Weak Perfect PAM conclude that B displays more assortativeness than A. However,
the likelihood ratio yields IL (A) = 3 and IL (B) = 2, suggesting that assortativeness has
decreased from A to B. This suggests that the Weak Perfect PAM plays a central role in
the empirical conclusions that the can be reached with the index.

2.4.2

Marginal Independence

To explain this paradox, it is interesting to refer to an older statistical literature that discusses
the properties of measures of association in the case of paired attributes (i.e., in our case,
husband’s and wife’s education). The Marginal Independence requirement posed by Edwards
(1963) states that the association should not be ‘influenced by the relative sizes of the
marginal totals’ (p. 110). That is, the measure should not change if one starts from a Table
T (a, b, c, d) and doubles the number of couples where the man is educated (while keeping
unchanged the ratio of educated versus uneducated wives). Formally, for any non negative
(a, b, c, d) and any positive λ, it should hold that:

I (λa, λb, c, d) = I (λa, b, λc, d) = I (a, λb, c, λd) = I (a, b, λc, λd) = I (a, b, c, d)

Edwards (1963) explains that the measure must only be a function of the proportion of
educated women whose husband is educated and the proportion of uneducated women whose
husband is educated (and conversely), so that any population change that keeps these proportions constant should not affect the index. The condition was later generalized by Altham
(1970) to the n × n case.
Among the indices just reviewed, only one - the odds ratio - satisfies Edwards’s marginal
invariance. It is interesting to consider how the other indices violate this requirement.
Consider Table Tλ = (λa, λb, c, d) with ad > bc and λ ≥ 1. Suppose λ increases. Then:
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• The minimum distance index increases since ∂IM D /∂λ > 0;
• The likelihood ratio decreases since ∂ILR /∂λ < 0;
• The correlation and Spearman correlation may increase or decrease depending on parameters.
In the previous example, educational attainment increases between cohorts A and B. This
mechanically generates a reduction in the likelihood ratio, driving the paradoxical result.

2.5

Structural interpretations

Finally, it is important to note that among the various indices, the odds ratio has the
additional advantage of having a known structural interpretation. Specifically, assume that
the observed matching behavior constitutes the stable equilibrium of a frictionless matching
model under transferable utility. Assume, furthermore, that the surplus generated by a
match between woman i belonging to category I and man j belonging to category J takes
the separable form:
s (i, j) = Z IJ + αiJ + βjI
where Z is a deterministic component depending only on individual educations and the
α, β are random shocks reflecting unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. It is now
well known (Graham (2011), Chiappori (2017)) that, keeping constant the distribution of
the shocks, assortativeness is related to the supermodularity of the matrix Z IJ (i.e., in the
2 × 2 case, to the sign of the supermodular core Z HS,HS + Z C,C − Z HS,C − Z C,HS ). More
importantly, if, following the seminal contribution by Choo and Siow (2006), one assumes
that the random shocks follow Type 1 extreme value distributions (the so-called Separable
Extreme Value or SEV model), then the supermodular core equals twice the odds ratio IO .
This structural interpretation is especially useful for disentangling possible changes in
the value of different matches from the mechanical effect of variations in the marginal distributions of education among individuals: ’structural changes’, here, can only affect either
9

the matrix Z or the distributions of random shocks. It is also useful for constructing counterfactual simulations, since the same structure can be applied to different distributions of
education by genders, using standard techniques to solve for the stable equilibrium of the
corresponding matching game.1

2.6

The n × n case

Extending the previous results to any number of educational categories raises a fundamental
problem: one cannot expect assortativeness to be uniform (or to vary uniformly) across the
various categories. For instance, matching patterns can be positive assortative at the top of
the distribution but not at the bottom (or conversely); and assortativeness may, over a given
period, increase among more educated groups while declining among the less educated ones.
In that sense, the ambition of summarizing the global evolution of assortativeness by a single
index is fraught with dangers, and can actually generate misleading results. A comparison
of assortativeness between two n × n Tables, even using the same index, can be performed
in various ways, potentially leading to different conclusions, simply because it is sensitive to
the choice of aggregation over several groups (or education levels in our running example).
In particular, statements like ’educational homogamy did not change over a given period’
should be handled with care, at least when they are based on a single measure: they may
reflect the absence of any variation, but also the net outcome of potentially large changes
operating in opposite directions for different subsets of the population.
In Chiappori, Costa-Dias and Meghir (2020), we discuss several possible strategies for
extending the previous analysis to the n × n case. One option is to concentrate on one
particular education category - say, the most educated - and ‘merge’ the remaining categories
into a single, ‘everybody else’ class. In this case, variations in assortativeness in different
margins would be concealed by the aggregation of many categories into a single one.

1

See Chiappori, Costa-Dias, Crossman and Meghir (2020) and Chiappori, Costa-Dias and Meghir (2020)
for an application of these ideas.
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3

Empirical example: educational homogamy among
educated people in the US

Based on the discussion above we now revisit the question of changes in assortative matching
in the US from the perspective of alternative indices. The key empirical difficulty underlying the measurement of the change in assortativeness is the substantial increase in college
education for men and more so for women over the period we consider.
That increase in education is illustrated in Table 1. The figures in the Table are estimated
using the March extract of the US Current Population Survey. We consider two birth cohorts,
1950-59 and 1970-75. The educational choices of these two cohorts were taken under very
different expectations about the college premium, with the later cohort facing a much higher
market return to college education than the earlier one. Consistently with that change, the
Table shows that the number of college educated men and women increased between the
two cohorts and that the change was especially marked among women, who became more
educated than men. Moreover, the increasing concentration of married individuals among
college graduates comes entirely at the expense of fewer individuals in the bottom education
group.
Table 1: Distribution of education among married men and women – birth cohorts 1950-59
and 1970-75

High School
and below

Some
College

4+ years
College degree

Birth cohort 1950-59
25.6
31.3
27.2
26.0

Men
Women

43.1
46.8

Men
Women

Birth cohort 1970-75
37.0
25.3
37.7
30.7
27.0
42.3

Data source: March extract of the US Current Population Survey, subsample of
married individuals observed when aged 35-44 and born in 1950-59 or 1970-75.
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Table 2: Marital assortativeness at the top of the distribution of education – comparing
birth cohorts 1950-59 and 1970-75

College vs
Some College
diff. across cohorts
adjusted p-value

0.214
0.000

College vs
less than College

At least Some College vs
High School and below

Panel A: Odds ratio
0.061
0.044
Panel B: χ2
0.040
0.000

0.293
0.000

diff. across cohorts
adjusted p-value

0.029
0.000

diff. across cohorts
adjusted p-value

0.001
0.888

Panel C: Minimum Distance
0.026
0.071
0.000
0.000

-0.046
0.000

Panel D: Likelihood ratio
-0.421
-0.125
0.000
0.000

diff. across cohorts
adjusted p-value

0.032
0.000

Notes: Columns identify each of the 2 × 2 sorting matrices. In each panel, row 1 shows estimates of the difference in the respective
index between the latest and earliest cohorts; row 2 shows p-values for 2-sided significance testing adjusted for multiple hypothesis
using the stepdown method for the three outcomes on the row. (Romano and Wolf (2005), Romano et al. (2008), Romano and
Wolf (2016)). Data source: March extract of the US Current Population Survey, subsample of married individuals observed when
aged 35-44 and born in 1950-59 or 1970-75.

Theory predicts that preferences for homogamy should increase as a result of the increase
in the college premium (Chiappori et al., 2017). Estimates in Table 2 show how the various
indices describe changes in PAM at the top of the education distribution across the two
cohorts. They refer to three different 2 × 2 tables, comparing College graduates with the
education group just below (column 1) and with everyone who did not graduate from College
(column 2), as well as those who attended College with those who did not (column 3).
We see that, in all cases, the odds ratio, the χ2 and the minimum distance index, which
all satisfy Symmetry and Weak Perfect PAM, conclude that assortativeness significantly
increased between the two cohorts. The likelihood ratio shows a significant reduction. The
conclusions may depend on the definition of education classes, as well as on the choice of the
two reference periods, as shown by Gihleb and Lang (2016). But the key point here is that for
any given data set, different indices provide different answers, depending on how sensitive
they are to changes in the marginal distributions (i.e., in our case, in the distribution of
12

education by gender). In particular, indices violating Weak Perfect PAM are more likely to
provide divergent measures in a context where marginal distributions experience significant
changes.

4

Concluding Remarks

It is relatively simple to estimate whether there is positive assortative matching in a stochastic marriage market along the dimensions of a characteristic such as education. However,
measuring the extent to which such assortative matching differs between two economies or
between two points in time for the same economy is challenging when the marginal distributions of the characteristics also change. Drawing from the statistics literature we define
simple conditions that any index should satisfy to provide a measure of change in sorting
that is not distorted by changes in the marginal distributions of the characteristic. We show
that conclusions regarding the evolution of homogamy can be significantly affected when
the indices under consideration violate these conditions. Indices that satisfy our conditions
show that educational homogamy at the top of the education distribution increased over the
recent decades.
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